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ANONYMITY IN CYBERSPACE: JUDICIAL AND
LEGISLATIVE REGULATIONS
Sophia Qasir*
Historically, the scope of constitutional protections for fundamental
rights has evolved to keep pace with new social norms and new technology.
Internet speech is on the rise. The First Amendment protects an
individual’s right to speak anonymously, but to what extent does it protect a
right to anonymous online speech? This question is difficult because the
government must balance the fundamental nature of speech rights with the
potential dangers associated with anonymous online speech, including
defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. While lower courts have held that there is a right to anonymous
online speech, they have not yet adopted a common standard. Meanwhile,
to simplify the confusion and protect the rights of those who are injured by
anonymous online speech, state legislatures are seeking to restrict some or
all anonymous online-speech rights.
This Note explores the history of speech regulation, with a special focus
on the history of anonymous online speech, and the justifications for
protecting speech rights. It then discusses the judicial standards under
which courts require disclosure of anonymous speakers and the current
legislative proposals to restrict speech rights. Next, this Note suggests that
legislatures should not restrict speech rights, and should instead expand the
remedies available to those injured by harmful speech. This Note also
suggests that courts should adopt a summary judgment standard that
requires plaintiffs to provide evidence demonstrating that the anonymous
speaker has committed a tort before requiring the speaker to disclose his or
her identity.
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INTRODUCTION
Anonymous speech has played an integral role in American history—
both proponents and opponents of ratification of the U.S. Constitution used
anonymous speech to convey their arguments to the general public.1 The
Supreme Court has implicitly and explicitly recognized that the right to free
speech includes the right to speak anonymously.2 However, the expansion
1. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay wrote the Federalist Papers
under the pseudonym of “Publius” to promote acceptance of the U.S. Constitution. See
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON & JOHN JAY, FEDERALIST PAPERS (Goldwin Smith,
ed. 1901). The Anti-Federalists, who opposed the ratification of the Constitution, also wrote
under pseudonyms, using the names Brutus, Cato, and Centinel. See HERBERT J. STORING,
THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST (1981).
2. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton,
536 U.S. 150, 166–67 (2002) (finding a law that required a permit to distribute pamphlets
door-to-door was unconstitutional, because it infringed upon the speaker’s First Amendment
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of the internet is stretching the outer limits of anonymous speech rights.
While the internet allows speakers to reach a broad audience quickly, it also
allows speakers to cause harm through destructive speech. Common
problems associated with anonymous online speech include defamation,3
tortious interference with business,4 and copyright infringement.5 Although
the Supreme Court has held that free speech rights apply on the internet,6 it
has not yet addressed the scope of anonymous online-speech rights.
So far, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits have held that there is a
constitutional right to speak anonymously but have not adopted a standard
to define the scope of that right.7 For example, some jurisdictions require
the plaintiff to meet a summary judgment standard before the court will
allow disclosure of a commenter’s identity.8 In other jurisdictions, the
plaintiff may need to win on a balancing test that weighs the interest of
disclosure against the interest in anonymity9 or merely show good-faith10
before he can discover the commenter’s identity.
Several state legislatures have also tried to address the scope of
protections available to anonymous speakers,11 but only one state has
succeeded in passing legislation that outlines the standard by which an
anonymous speaker’s identity can be disclosed to the interested party.12
rights); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341–42 (1995) (“[T]he
anonymity of an author is not ordinarily a sufficient reason to exclude her work product from
the protections of the First Amendment.”); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960)
(holding that a regulation prohibiting the distribution of anonymous handbills was
unconstitutional).
3. See, e.g., Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).
4. See, e.g., Quixtar Inc. v. Signature Mgmt. Team, LLC, 566 F. Supp. 2d 1205 (D.
Nev. 2008) (noting that the plaintiff alleged that the defendant unlawfully interfered in the
plaintiff’s business through an online smear campaign using anonymous postings).
5. See, e.g., Sony Music Entm’t Inc. v. Does 1–40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556 (S.D.N.Y.
2004).
6. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
7. Compare SI03, Inc. v. Bodybuilding.com, LLC, 441 F. App’x 431, 433 (9th Cir.
2011) (vacating the district court’s decision to apply the summary judgment standard,
because the district court had not identified “the nature of the speech in question”), with In re
Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1177 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in applying a summary judgment standard). The Fourth
Circuit addressed the issue of anonymous online speech in Peterson v. National
Telecommunications and Information Administration, 478 F.3d 626, 633–34 (4th Cir. 2007),
but did not address the substantive scope of the right to anonymous speech, instead finding
that the right to anonymity was not challenged because the petitioner lacked standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the act. For a discussion of the various standards that
courts have adopted, see infra Part III.A.
8. E.g., Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).
9. E.g., Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999);
Dendrite Int’l Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
10. E.g., In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26 (Cir. Ct.
2000).
11. See infra Part III.B.
12. Virginia has enacted legislation that established a uniform standard for granting
“John Doe” subpoenas, but does not directly restrict anonymous speech. See VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-407.1 (2012). California considered similar legislation. A.B. 1143, 2003 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2003), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/asm/ab_1101-
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Two states have passed legislation that restricts the anonymous speech
rights of convicted sex offenders.13 The government, however, cannot
restrict the right to free speech without complying with due process
requirements of the Fifth Amendment because it is a fundamental right.14
Moreover, individuals need sufficient notice of what speech is protected.15
The First Amendment prohibits the government from enacting a law that
“abridge[s] the freedom of speech,”16 but such a right is not absolute and is
subject to countervailing interests.17 For example, the government has
imposed restrictions on speech that may incite imminent lawless action,18
fighting words,19 speech before a hostile audience,20 obscenity,21 and

1150/ab_1143_bill_20030221_introduced.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2013). The measure
passed in the Assembly, but was later abandoned by the state senate. See Complete Bill
History, OFFICIAL CAL. LEGIS. INFO., http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/asm/ab
_1101-1150/ab_1143_bill_20041130_history.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2013). Georgia
passed legislation criminalizing the transmission of data under a false name. See GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-9-93.1 (West 2012). A federal court in Georgia interpreted this law as a
restriction on anonymous speech and granted an injunction prohibiting the enforcement of
the Act. See ACLU of Ga. v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228, 1235 (N.D. Ga. 1997). New Jersey
also considered a bill that would require individuals to register with websites before being
allowed to post on those websites, significantly undermining the right to anonymity. See
A.B.
1327,
212th
Leg.,
1st
Sess.
(N.J.
2006),
available
at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2006/Bills/A1500/1327_I1.PDF (last visited Apr. 19, 2013).
Currently, the New York State legislature is considering the Internet Protection Act, which is
similar to the New Jersey proposal. See A.B. 8688, 2012 Leg., 235th Sess. (N.Y. 2012),
available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=%0D%0A&bn=A.8688&term=
2011&Summary=Y&Text=Y (last visited Apr. 19, 2013); see also infra Part I.C.2.
13. See Californians Against Sexual Exploitation Act, 2012 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 35,
§ 12 (West) (to be codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.015(a)(4) (West 2013)), available at
http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2012/general/pdf/text-proposed-laws-v2.pdf#nameddest=prop35;
GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(16)(K) (West 2008), invalidated by White v. Baker, 696 F.
Supp. 2d 1289 (N.D. Ga. 2010).
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
15. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012) (“A
fundamental principle in our legal system is that laws which regulate persons or entities must
give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden or required.”).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
17. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN & JESSE H. CHOPER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES,
COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 2 (5th ed. 2011).
18. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that a state
statute that prohibited speech that advocated violence, rather than the incitement of violence,
was unconstitutional, because it infringed upon speakers’ right to free speech).
19. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). In Chaplinsky, the Court
affirmed the conviction of a speaker who violated a state law that prohibited any person from
addressing offensive, derisive, or annoying words to any other person, because the law was
not unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 574.
20. See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 318–21 (1951) (upholding the
constitutionality of a statute that prohibited speech that may cause a breach of the peace
because the state has the power to prevent the outbreak of violence).
21. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763–64 (1982) (affirming constitutionality of
a state statute that restricted the sale of pornography depicting children because the First
Amendment does not protect child pornography and the law was not overbroad or vague);
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (holding that states may restrict the sale of
pornographic “works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which
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defamation.22 Although anonymous online speech may contain elements of
speech that may be restricted, it also includes many protected areas of
speech, including political speech and other expressive activities that may
not be restricted. Thus, it is necessary to evaluate the extent to which the
justifications for restricting speech apply to an online context and how such
regulation can be shaped to prevent chilling protected elements of
anonymous speech.
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence relating to speech regulations, civil liability that may curtail
speech rights, and the history of anonymous speech in traditional contexts.
Part II explores the arguments for and against strengthening anonymous
speech rights in an online context. Part III discusses the various standards
that courts use when determining whether to grant a subpoena request to
disclose the identity of an anonymous speaker. Lastly, Part IV argues that
courts should require plaintiffs to meet a modified summary judgment
standard before allowing the disclosure of an anonymous speaker and that
the legislature should not seek to ban anonymous online speech.
I. LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF ANONYMOUS ONLINE SPEECH PROTECTION
In the United States, the First Amendment protects the right to free
speech, which is considered a fundamental right.23
Despite the
Amendment’s broad language that “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech,”24 there is a near universal acceptance that
the right to free speech includes some limits.25 This part discusses the legal
landscape of anonymous speech. Part I.A considers the standard of review
of speech regulations, focusing on defamation and commercial speech. Part
I.B then examines the history of anonymous speech regulation.
A. Speech Regulation Standards
The standard of scrutiny that the court applies in determining the
constitutionality of a law often depends on the type of regulation and its

portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value”).
22. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (holding that states may
determine the standard for liability for newscasters who make defamatory statements
regarding private individuals); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964)
(holding that a publisher that makes an honest mistake of fact regarding the conduct of a
public official cannot be held civilly liable, because the First Amendment protects the free
discourse of ideas).
23. See, e.g., Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269–70 (discussing U.S. Supreme Court cases that
considered the fundamental nature of free speech rights); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (discussing how the right to free speech is a
“fundamental principle of the American government”).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
25. See SHIFFRIN & CHOPER, supra note 17, at 2. The most common example is that
there is no right to falsely announce that there is a fire in crowded theater. Id.
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relationship to the aims of the First Amendment.26 A threshold question is
whether the regulation seeks to proscribe limits on speech or activity.27 If
the law seeks to regulate speech, then the court must determine whether the
legislation discriminates based on the content of the speech, whether the
legislation is sufficiently specific to give individuals notice of their rights,
and whether it limits only unprotected areas of speech.28 The standard of
review that the court applies depends, in part, on the type of regulation.
This section discusses the standards for content-based regulation, the
overbreadth and vagueness doctrines, and commercial speech.
1. Content-Based Regulations
Content-based regulations, which prohibit speech based on the ideas or
subject matter of the speaker’s message, are presumptively unconstitutional
and subject to strict scrutiny.29 Under the strict scrutiny standard, the
government must prove that such regulations are narrowly tailored to serve
a compelling governmental interest.30 The Supreme Court has found that
the government may restrict “fighting words”31 and words that will incite
imminent lawless action,32 because the government has a compelling
interest in maintaining public order and such restrictions do not
significantly restrict a speaker’s ability to convey a message.33 The
government, however, does not have a compelling interest in regulating
speech “in order to maintain what [it] regard[s] as a suitable level of
discourse within the body politic.”34
Content-neutral regulations that restrict speech are subject to intermediate
scrutiny because such regulations are less likely to discriminate against
certain viewpoints or suppress public dialogue.35 Under intermediate
26. Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (stating that
there is a narrow presumption of constitutionality when legislation restricts a right protected
by the first ten amendments).
27. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
28. See id. at 376–77.
29. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). Strict scrutiny is a
standard of review that courts use to evaluate the constitutionality of government action
when it deprives an individual or group of individuals of a fundamental right. ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 554 (4th ed. 2011). Strict
scrutiny requires that the government show it has a compelling interest and that the means
used are narrowly tailored or necessary to achieve those ends. Id.
30. See, e.g., R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395 (finding that an ordinance that regulates speech
based on the hostility of content was invalid, because it is not narrowly tailored to serve the
compelling government interest of protecting groups that have been historically subject to
discrimination).
31. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (establishing the
“fighting words” doctrine under which the government may permissibly proscribe speech
that may result in a breach of the peace).
32. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that
speech may be regulated if it is reasonably calculated to incite “imminent lawless action and
is likely to incite or produce such action”).
33. See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 381; Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
34. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 23 (1971).
35. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
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scrutiny, the government must show that the law is substantially related to
an important governmental interest.36 While content-neutral regulations
can be innocent and have a minimal effect on speech, such as through
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions,37 content-neutral laws may
restrict a broader range of speech than content-based regulations.38 Thus, a
court is likely to review with greater judicial scrutiny a law that restricts the
use of all anonymous speech, because it would significantly infringe upon
speakers’ ability to exercise their First Amendment rights.39
2. Doctrines of Overbreadth and Vagueness
Furthermore, any regulations on speech must be specific and have a
defined scope.40 A law is unconstitutionally vague when “a reasonable
person cannot tell what speech is protected and what is permitted.”41 The
limits must be clearly defined both to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory
application of the law, and to ensure that individuals have sufficient notice
of their rights.42 The overbreadth doctrine is used to invalidate laws that
impose greater restrictions than are constitutionally permissible.43 These
doctrines are particularly relevant in the context of anonymous speech
regulation because the regulations must be specific enough to avoid
restricting protected speech while being clear enough to give individuals
notice of the permissible bounds of their rights.44
3. Commercial Speech Regulation
Commercial speech is entitled to less protection than other forms of
speech.45 The Supreme Court laid out the test for regulating commercial
speech in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service

36. See 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 3:2 (3d
ed. 1996).
37. See id.
38. Id.
39. See id.; see also Sharkey’s, Inc. v. City of Waukesha, 265 F. Supp. 2d 984, 994
(E.D. Wis. 2003) (holding that content neutral laws “by no means receive a free pass under
the First Amendment” (quoting Clarkson v. Town of Florence, 198 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1006
(E.D. Wis. 2002))).
40. See SMOLLA, supra note 36, § 6:2.
41. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, at 970.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 972; see also SMOLLA, supra note 36, §§ 6:3–6:4.
44. See SMOLLA, supra note 36, § 6:13. The doctrine of vagueness is not unique to
speech regulation; it also applies in criminal law and for any deprivation of a constitutional
liberty. See id.; see also United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (“Vagueness
doctrine is an outgrowth not of the First Amendment, but of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.”); Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 393 (1926) (“The dividing
line between what is lawful and unlawful cannot be left to conjecture.” (quoting United
States v. Capital Traction Co., 34 App. D.C. 592, 598 (1910))).
45. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Gas Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562–63
(1980) (“The Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to
other constitutionally guaranteed expression.”).
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Commission.46 While there is no clear definition of commercial speech,
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky describes commercial speech as a type of
advertisement that refers to a specific product and was made with an
economic motivation.47 Under this standard, speech may be limited or
proscribed if the speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading,
there is a substantial government interest, the regulation directly advances
the government interest, and the regulation is narrowly tailored.48 The
Central Hudson test has since been modified, and now—although
ostensibly still intermediate level review—it more closely resembles strict
scrutiny.49
Courts have not yet developed a clear standard for identifying when
anonymous online speech is commercial.50 In some cases, courts have
found anonymous speech that interferes with business practices or involves
copyright infringement to constitute commercial speech.51 In other cases,
courts have found anonymous speech to be purely expressive and therefore
not considered commercial speech.52 Whether the classification of speech
is relevant to determining the appropriate level of protection that courts and
legislatures should afford speech will be discussed below.53
B. Speech Torts
Although the Constitution restricts the ability of the government to
regulate speech, speakers may be held liable for the consequences of their
speech in private actions. Speech may give rise to tort actions for
46. Id.
47. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, at 1125; see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods.
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66–67 (1983) (finding a pamphlet to constitute commercial speech
because it was an advertisement, referred to a single product, and the speaker had an
economic motivation for the speech, but noting that any individual factor was not
dispositive).
48. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co., 447 U.S. at 566.
49. See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 360 (2002) (finding that a
federal law restricting the ability of drug providers to advertise their drugs was
unconstitutional because the government did not have a sufficient interest in regulating
commercial speech in that context); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 562–66
(2001) (stating that strict scrutiny did not apply to a law restricting commercial speech, but
conducting a thorough analysis of the state’s justification to find the law unconstitutional);
Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183–88 (1999); 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 504 (1996) (noting that a prohibition on
speech unrelated to consumer protection must be reviewed with “special care”).
50. Cf. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1177 (9th Cir. 2011) (“We
need not, however, decide if the speech at issue here constitutes commercial speech under
the Supreme Court’s definition in Central Hudson.”).
51. See, e.g., Sony Music Entm’t Inc. v. Does 1–40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 558, 562–63
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (analyzing a copyright infringement claim where there was a low speech
interest).
52. E.g., Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001) (rejecting a subpoena request for an anonymous commenters’ identity, because the
plaintiff failed to show harm from an allegedly defamatory comment, and allowing the
discovery would chill the commenter’s speech rights).
53. See infra Part IV.
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defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. This part discusses these speech torts and their applicability to
online speech.
1. Defamation
Defamation is a tort that allows a plaintiff to bring a civil action to
recover damages when he suffers reputational harm due to a defendant’s
speech.54 Defamation includes the torts of libel, which occurs when the
speech is written, and slander, which occurs when the speech is spoken.55
To prove defamation at common law, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant made a false, defamatory comment regarding the plaintiff and
that the comment was published.56 A defamatory comment is one that
injures the plaintiff’s reputation or diminishes “the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in which the plaintiff is held.”57
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,58 the Supreme Court added a mens
rea element that requires plaintiffs to prove that that the publisher acted
“with actual malice” when making a statement about a public official.59
This requirement means that the publisher knew the falsity of his statement
or acted recklessly with regard to the truth.60 However, a speaker who
expresses an opinion, as determined by a court, cannot be held liable for
defamation.61 Although Sullivan applied only when the plaintiff was a
public official and the defamatory comment related to his or her official
conduct, the Court has extended the rule to apply to all public figures.62
Defamation is more likely to occur online than in print because there is
less editorial oversight in online speech and because online speakers are not
bound to the same professional and social mores that restrict journalists’
and identified speakers’ practices.63 Defamation in an online context can
be difficult to prosecute because in many cases it is obvious that the
individual speaker is expressing his or her opinion rather than making a
54. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, at 1078; see also Ryan M. Martin, Freezing the Net:
Rejecting a One-Size-Fits-All Standard for Unmasking Anonymous Internet Speakers in
Defamation Lawsuits, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1217, 1225–27 (2007).
55. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 771 (5th ed. 1984). Libel
originated as a crime, while slander could only be brought as a criminal action in conjunction
with another offense, such as sedition, blasphemy, or a breach of the peace. Id. at 785; see
also Susan W. Brenner, Should Online Defamation Be Criminalized?, 76 MISS. L.J. 705,
709–14 (2007) (discussing the history of defamation law from its common law origins).
56. See, e.g., 19 AM. JUR. Trials § 499 (2012); 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander § 87 (2012).
57. KEETON ET AL., supra note 55, at 773.
58. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
59. Id. at 279–80.
60. Id.
61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977); see also KEETON ET AL., supra
note 55, at 839–40.
62. See Curtis Publ’g. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155–56 (1967) (noting that the
similarities in libel actions against public officials and public figures provided a basis for
applying the Sullivan standard to public figures).
63. See Brenner, supra note 55, at 741–42 (discussing how print publishing undergoes a
filtering process, whereas online publishing does not).
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statement of fact.64 For example, in Doe v. Cahill, the court found that
readers of a news website would not take seriously comments that criticized
a public official’s performance as a city councilman, because readers would
understand the comments to be opinion.65 Given the generally informal
nature of the internet, it is possible that a broad reading of “opinion” will
hinder plaintiffs’ ability to bring successful defamation claims.66
2. Invasion of Privacy
Privacy torts may also lawfully restrict speech rights.67 These torts stem
from a general right to privacy, which Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis
characterized as a “general right of the individual to be let alone.”68
Warren and Brandeis derived this right from the torts of defamation,
invasion of property rights, and breach of implied contract.69 The privacy
torts include unreasonable intrusion, public disclosure of private facts, false
light, and appropriation.70 This section will discuss these torts and their
relationship to speech rights.
a. Unreasonable Intrusion
The right to privacy protects an individual’s right to be protected from
unreasonable or offensive intrusion into her private affairs and concerns.71
This right protects both physical privacy72 and other intrusions, such as the
prohibition on eavesdropping, restrictions on persistent, unwanted
telephone calls, and prying into some forms of personal records.73 The
Second Restatement of Torts states that an individual will be liable for
unreasonable intrusion if he intentionally intruded upon the solicitude or
64. See Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 466 (Del. 2005) (“[A] reasonable person reading a
newspaper in print or online, for example, can assume that the statements are factually based
and researched. This is not the case when the statements are made on blogs or in chat
rooms.”).
65. Id. at 465.
66. S. Elizabeth Malloy, Anonymous Blogging and Defamation: Balancing Interests on
the Internet, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1187, 1190–91 (2006).
67. The right to privacy from governmental intrusion developed in the line of cases
started by Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), is conceptually distinct from the
right discussed in this Note.
68. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
205 (1890).
69. Id. at 193–95.
70. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960); see also
Patricia Sánchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, 21 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 8–9 (2007) (noting that Prosser’s four categories of privacy torts have been
incorporated into modern American jurisprudence); Maayan Y. Vodovis, Note, Look over
Your Figurative Shoulder: How To Save Individual Dignity and Privacy on the Internet, 40
HOFSTRA L. REV. 811, 816–17 (2012) (noting that there are four recognized categories of
privacy torts at common law).
71. KEETON ET AL., supra note 55, at 854.
72. The right to physical privacy includes the right to physical solitude, seclusion, and
protection of the home. Id.
73. Id. at 854–55.
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seclusion of another and the intrusion is highly offensive to a reasonable
person.74 While this tort is used in the internet context primarily to prevent
information gathering that reasonable people would find offensive, it is also
relevant to the concept of anonymous online speech.75 An individual may
have a claim against a speaker who publicizes a private fact that does not
have public concern and the disclosure of which a reasonable person would
find offensive.76
b. Public Disclosure of Private Facts
Another category of privacy torts that is relevant in an online context is
public disclosure of private facts. The exact requirements of the
information that must be disclosed and the circumstances of the disclosure
are debated.77 For example, Prosser argues that to recover damages, a
plaintiff must prove public disclosure of private facts that would be “highly
offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary
The Second Restatement includes an additional
sensibilities.”78
requirement that there is no public interest in the disclosure of the
information.79 Professor Hill, on the other hand, advocates for a more
nuanced test that balances the extent of the disclosure with the character of
the material that is disclosed.80 All standards, however, agree that the
disclosure must be “highly offensive and objectionable to a reasonable
person of ordinary sensibilities.”81
This tort reflects the tension between a speaker’s First Amendment right
to anonymous speech and others’ common law rights and informational
privacy interests.82 While some commentators suggest that online speech
should be given greater protection despite its sometimes offensive nature,83
courts have generally applied a consistent standard to online- and offline-

74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
75. See Vodovis, supra note 70, at 817.
76. See Abril, supra note 70, at 9.
77. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. d, with Alfred Hill,
Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1205, 1258–62
(1976). For a modern assessment of Professor Hill’s disagreement with the Second
Restatement’s approach, see Robert D. Sack, Protection of Opinion Under the First
Amendment: Reflections on Alfred Hill, “Defamation and Privacy Under the First
Amendment,” 100 COLUM. L. REV. 294, 310–13 (2000).
78. KEETON ET AL., supra note 55, at 856–57.
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. d.
80. See Hill, supra note 77, at 1258–62.
81. KEETON ET AL., supra note 55, at 856–57. Public figures, however, have a
diminished right of privacy. Id. at 859–60.
82. Anita L. Allen, Privacy Jurisprudence As an Instrument of Social Change: First
Amendment Privacy and the Battle for Progressively Liberal Social Change, 14 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 885, 920–21 (2012).
83. See id. at 924–25; cf. Amy Pomerantz Nickerson, Comment, Coercive Discovery
and the First Amendment: Towards a Heightened Discoverability Standard, 57 UCLA L.
REV. 841, 869–70 (2010) (suggesting that there should be a heightened standard before
allowing discovery of speech-related activities).
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speech torts.84 Such consistent treatment, however, may be problematic
because anonymous online speech may pose unique harms, as discussed
below in Part II.B.85
c. False Light
False light in the public eye occurs when an individual’s speech or
conduct characterizes another in an untrue manner or is deceptive.86 This
may, for example, include attributing articles or opinions to the speaker,
unauthorized use of another’s name on a petition, or filing suit on behalf of
another.87 As with defamation, in a false light claim the plaintiff must
prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that the facts were wrong or
acted with reckless disregard for the truth.88 Unlike defamation, however,
some states do not require the plaintiff to prove that there was an injury to
his reputation.89 Frequently, statements that give rise to a false light claim
may be defamatory and give rise to an action for libel or slander.90
Nevertheless, the two actions protect different interests.91 Defamation
actions protect an individual’s reputation, while false light actions protect
the plaintiff’s right to be left alone.92
d. Appropriation
Appropriation occurs when a defendant uses the plaintiff’s name or
likeness for the defendant’s advantage or benefit.93 Merely using another’s
name or publishing some aspects of another’s person or property is
insufficient unless it identifies a specific individual who can be recognized
by others.94 Appropriation may conflict with the First Amendment when an
individual wants to use an image or likeness for disseminating the news or

84. See Allen, supra note 82, at 924–25 (“[Courts] have tended to view speech that
would be tortious off line as tortious online.”).
85. See also Abril, supra note 70, at 28 (suggesting a new analysis for the public
disclosure tort in the online context); Malloy, supra note 66, at 1192–93 (discussing how
online speech is more harmful than traditional modes of speech).
86. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 55, at 863. The statement, however, does not
necessarily need to be something negative about the plaintiff and can even involve
statements that falsely enhance the plaintiff’s reputation. See SMOLLA, supra note 36, § 24:3.
87. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 55, at 863–64.
88. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387–88 (1967).
89. See SMOLLA, supra note 36, § 24:3.
90. See Flowers v. Carville, 310 F.3d 1118, 1132–33 (9th Cir. 2002) (allowing the
plaintiff to maintain both false light and defamation claims); KEETON ET AL., supra note 55,
at 864. But see Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1113–15 (Fla. 2008) (holding
that Florida does not recognize a false light invasion of privacy tort because the overlap with
defamation is too great).
91. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 55, at 864.
92. See id.; SMOLLA, supra note 36, § 24:3.
93. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977); see also KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 55, at 851; SMOLLA, supra note 36, § 24:4.
94. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 55, at 852–53.
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for publicity.95 Appropriation oftentimes occurs in cases of copyright
infringement—and thus courts may give such speech less protection than
they gives to other forms of speech96—but the Supreme Court has held that
the First Amendment may protect some forms of appropriation.97
3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The tort for the infliction of emotional distress developed from a
recognition that, in some cases, speech could cause significant injury.98
Although the tort originated from cases where the mental distress was
associated with another tort, such as assault, battery, or false
imprisonment,99 courts created an independent action for purely mental
distress.100 An intentional infliction of emotional distress claim requires the
plaintiff to prove that the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly, the
conduct was extreme and outrageous, and it caused the plaintiff to suffer
distress that no reasonable person could be expected to endure.101 In these
cases, the injury must be significant; a plaintiff cannot recover against mere
insults, indignity, annoyance, threats, or rough language.102 Although
intentional infliction of emotional distress oftentimes may arise from
speech, Professor Smolla argues that courts should not mischaracterize
defamation or invasion of privacy claims as intentional infliction of
emotional distress, because it would disrupt the First Amendment balances
inherent in defamation or invasion of privacy claims.103
C. Anonymous Speech Regulation
As with all other forms of speech, the Supreme Court has recognized that
the right to anonymous speech is not absolute. This part considers the
development of the right to anonymous speech and the areas in which the
Court has curtailed the right to anonymous speech.

95. See Ann-Margret v. High Soc’y Magazine, 498 F. Supp. 401, 404–06 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (finding that the right to free speech transcends the right to privacy where a defendant
used an image of the plaintiff that had appeared in a popular movie); SMOLLA, supra note 36,
§ 24:4.
96. Cf. SMOLLA, supra note 36, § 24:4.
97. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576–78 (1977) (holding
that a plaintiff, whose performance was recorded and replayed on the news without his
consent, may maintain an action against the broadcasting company, but noting that there are
some cases in which the First Amendment would protect appropriation).
98. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 55, at 56–57.
99. Id.
100. See Wilkinson v. Downton, (1897) 2 Q.B. 57 (Eng.) (allowing a plaintiff, who
suffered serious mental and physical consequences after falsely being told that her husband
had been harmed in an accident, to recover against the speaker).
101. See SMOLLA, supra note 36, § 24:8.
102. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 55, at 59.
103. See SMOLLA, supra note 36, § 24:8.
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1. Legal Support for Anonymous Speech Rights
Individuals in the United States have been exercising their right to speak
anonymously since the time of the nation’s founding.104 The Supreme
Court cited the history and importance of anonymous speech—particularly
in the context of political speech—in Talley v. California,105 in which the
Court held unconstitutional a city ordinance that prohibited the distribution
of anonymously printed handbills.106 In Talley, the State argued that the
restriction was not content based and was aimed at furthering a compelling
government interest—preventing fraud, false advertising, and libel.107 The
Court held that while these were valid purposes, the ordinance was
unconstitutional because it was not narrowly tailored to serve those ends as
the ordinance was overbroad and would proscribe protected areas of
speech.108 The Court instead suggested that regulations specifically
addressing fraudulent speech, false advertising, and libel would be more
likely to be found constitutional.109
The Supreme Court expanded the protections for anonymous speech in
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,110 when it held unconstitutional a
state law prohibiting the distribution of campaign literature that did not
contain the name and address of the individual or organization issuing the
literature.111 The Ohio Supreme Court had distinguished McIntyre from
Talley on the grounds that the Ohio regulation at issue in McIntyre was
limited to speech that was “designed to influence voters in an election,”112
whereas the California ordinance in Talley restricted any distribution of
anonymous pamphlets.113 The Court held that there was a strong interest in
allowing anonymous political speech and that this provision should be
subject to exacting—or strict—scrutiny because it was content based and
involved an infringement on political expression.114 In the Court’s opinion,
this was a standard that the State failed to meet.115
The Supreme Court has also recognized the right of anonymity in the
context of the right to freedom of association.116 In NAACP v. Alabama ex
104. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
105. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
106. Id. at 64–65.
107. See id. at 64.
108. Id. at 62–64.
109. Id. at 64.
110. 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995) (“[A]n author’s decision to remain anonymous, like other
decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of
the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.”).
111. Id. at 357.
112. Id. at 344.
113. See id.
114. Id. at 346 (citing Meyer v. Grant, 386 U.S. 414, 420 (1988)).
115. Id. at 357. The Supreme Court affirmed the right to anonymous speech more
recently in Watchtower Bible & Tract Society v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002),
when it struck down a law that prohibited individuals from going door-to-door, finding that
the law may chill ordinary neighborly conduct.
116. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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rel. Patterson,117 the Supreme Court held that the government may not
compel organizations to disclose the identities of their members because it
may restrain members’ freedom of association.118 Although not directly
applicable to the issue of anonymous speech, this case establishes that
anonymity is a right that may be necessary to protect other fundamental
rights.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue of
anonymous speech rights in an online context, the Court has held that
traditional First Amendment rights apply online.119 In the case In re
Anonymous Online Speakers,120 the Ninth Circuit needed to determine
whether a plaintiff could obtain a subpoena to reveal the identity of
anonymous commenters who had been accused of tortiously interfering
with the plaintiff’s business by launching a smear campaign.121 The court
held that online speech “stands on the same footing as other speech—there
is ‘no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should
be applied’ to online speech.”122 Nevertheless, the court found that the
anonymous online speakers’ identities could be disclosed because their
speech was not political speech and thus was subject to a lower level of
protection.123
2. Regulation of Anonymous Speech
The Court has curtailed the right to anonymous speech through
disclosure requirements in campaign finance laws that require individuals to
disclose the amount of money they have contributed to political parties or
candidate’s campaigns. In Buckley v. Valeo,124 the Supreme Court
reviewed the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971 and the 1974 amendments.125 The Act imposed a maximum
contribution limit and required disclosures of contributions and
expenditures over a certain threshold.126 Challengers of the Act argued that
117. Id.
118. Id. at 462.
119. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870–72 (1997) (applying constitutional
protections to invalidate a portion of the Communications Decency Act that prohibited
indecent communications because the Act was not content neutral).
120. 661 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2011).
121. Id. at 1172–73.
122. Id. at 1173 (quoting Reno, 521 U.S. at 870).
123. Id. See infra Part III.A for a discussion of the standards used by various courts in
deciding whether to issue a subpoena to reveal the identity of an anonymous online
commenter.
124. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
125. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3, as amended
by the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat.
1263 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
126. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f) (2006). The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 created the
Federal Election Commission and requires candidates and political committees to disclose
their contributions, id. § 434, limits the contributions individuals can make to candidates, id.
§ 441a(a), imposes caps on presidential candidates’ expenditures, id. § 441a(b), and imposes
other caps on election spending, id. § 441a(a).

3666

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

the law restricted individuals’ First Amendment rights, because campaign
contributions are a form of expression and allow individuals to show
support for a certain candidate or issue.127 The challengers also argued that
the disclosure requirements infringed upon their freedom of association.128
The Court, however, rejected these arguments, finding that, although
donations are a form of expression and restrictions on them may infringe
upon some speech rights, the restrictions did not undermine the ability of
citizens to engage in meaningful debate about the candidates and the
relevant issues.129 The Court also found that the disclosure requirements
did not violate individuals’ First Amendment rights because the government
was able to show that the disclosure served a legitimate governmental
interest in maintaining the integrity of the political process, deterring
corruption, and enforcing the caps on independent expenditure limits.130
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the government’s ability to require
disclosure in Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission.131 In one
issue determined in Citizens United, the Court determined that the
disclaimer and disclosure requirements of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act132 did not violate the First Amendment because, although the
requirements may burden speech, they did not prevent speakers from
conveying their message.133 However, the Court found that the regulation
suppressing political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate
identity134 and barring independent corporate expenditures violated the First
Amendment.135 In contrast, the Court upheld the disclaimer and disclosure
requirements because it determined that the government’s interest in
providing the electorate with necessary information to make informed
decisions justified the burden it imposed on speech.136
II. LEGAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF ANONYMOUS
ONLINE-SPEECH PROTECTIONS
Although the right to anonymous speech is not absolute, the reasons for
restricting anonymous speech—such as those advanced in Buckley and
Citizens United—may not be applicable to anonymous online speech
because the same countervailing justifications for restrictions may not be
present. The Supreme Court has specifically held that Buckley does not
127. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14.
128. Id. at 11.
129. See id. at 29.
130. Id. at 66–69.
131. 130 S. Ct. 876, 913–15 (2010).
132. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 2 U.S.C and 36 U.S.C.). This Act amended the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
and imposed limits on soft money contributions, increased contribution limits for state
committees of political parties, and imposed reporting requirements on independent
expenditures, among other things. Id.
133. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913–14.
134. Id. at 913.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 914.
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operate to restrict anonymous speech rights in other contexts because the
justification in Buckley was limited to avoiding the appearance of
corruption and to enforce campaign finance restrictions.137
To determine the degree of protection that courts should afford
anonymous online speakers, it is necessary to examine the justifications for
protecting free speech. Part II.A discusses the historic justifications for free
speech protection, focusing on the importance of anonymous speech. Part
II.B explores the countervailing justifications for restricting anonymous
speech.
A. Rationales for Protecting Anonymous Online Speech
Historically, speech has been protected because it promotes the free
exchange of ideas, which is necessary to discover the truth,138 self-govern,
check governmental power, and protect individual autonomy and
liberties.139 These same concerns apply to speech on the internet and can
be used to justify extending First Amendment protections to anonymous
The internet represents a new medium of
online speakers.140
communication and anonymous bloggers may be considered “the modernday equivalent of the revolutionary pamphleteer who passed out news
bulletins on the street corner.”141 As such, commentators argue that those
speakers should not be required to disclose their identities unless the
plaintiffs can show that they may have a legitimate claim against the
speaker.142 Courts and commentators agree that anonymous online speech
should be protected because the values inherent in promoting free speech
continue to apply in an online context,143 the justifications that exist for
restricting anonymous speech in other contexts144 do not apply to online

137. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 354 (1995) (“Required
disclosures about the level of financial support a candidate has received from various sources
are supported by an interest in avoiding the appearance of corruption that has no application
to this case.”).
138. The truth-seeking function of speech, or the notion of a “market place of ideas,”
derives from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
139. See Nickerson, supra note 83, at 869–70.
140. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (extending First Amendment
protection to online speech).
141. David L. Hudson, Jr., Blogs and the First Amendment, 11 NEXUS 129, 131 (2006)
(quoting Sen. John Cornyn) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Daniel J. Solove, A
Tale of Two Bloggers: Free Speech and Privacy in the Blogosphere, 84 WASH. U. L. REV.
1195, 1196 (2006) (discussing Glenn Reynolds’s assertion that modern bloggers may
supplement and challenge traditional media coverage).
142. Jocelyn Hanamirian, Note, The Right To Remain Anonymous: Anonymous Speakers,
Confidential Sources and the Public Good, 35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 119, 119 (2011);
Hudson, supra note 141, at 132.
143. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 870 (holding that there is “no basis for qualifying the level of
First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to [the internet]”).
144. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 354 (1995).
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speech, and the government should protect speakers’ legitimate
expectations of privacy.145
Although Buckley v. Valeo upheld disclosure requirements, at least one
scholar has suggested that courts reconsider the disclosure requirement in
light of technological developments and increased concern for privacy.146
Professor Amy Sanders argues that anonymous commenters have an
expectation of privacy that should not be defeated unless there is a
compelling reason or unless the commenter agreed to disclosure when
posting on the website.147 Courts recognize that if government actions
diminish speakers’ expectations of privacy, speakers are more likely to
restrain their speech, thereby resulting in a chilling effect that deprives
individuals of their rights to speak anonymously.148
Proponents of broad speech protection argue that anonymous speech
helps promote the truth-seeking function by allowing individuals to express
themselves without fear that they may be harassed, socially ostracized, or
that they may lose their jobs.149 Furthermore, they argue, anonymity helps
ensure that the merits or value of the speaker’s message is not discounted,
stereotyped, or prejudged on the basis of the speaker’s characteristics.150
Commentator Mike Godwin notes that online speech and the internet can

145. See Nathaniel Gleicher, John Doe Subpoenas: Towards a Consistent Legal
Standard, 118 YALE L.J. 320, 360–61 (2008) (discussing how various courts have inquired
into the defendant’s expectation of privacy). Compare Sony Music Entm’t Inc. v. Does 1–
40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting that the court should consider the
parties’ expectation of privacy when deciding whether to allow discovery of identifiable
information from an ISP), with Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 762 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (looking to a website’s privacy policy to determine whether
defendants had a reasonable expectation of privacy).
146. William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntryre’s Checkbook: Privacy Costs of Political
Contribution Disclosure, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 7 (2003).
147. Amy Kristin Sanders & Patrick C. File, Giving Users a Plain Deal: ContractRelated Media Liability for Unmasking Anonymous Commenters, 16 COMM. L. & POL’Y 197,
207–08 (2011).
148. See White v. Baker, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1310–11 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (holding that a
law that would require the plaintiff to disclose his online identity would chill his right to
anonymous online speech); Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 462 (Del. 2005) (“[A]llowing a
defamation plaintiff to unmask an anonymous defendant’s identity through the judicial
process is a crucial form of relief that if too easily obtained will chill the exercise of First
Amendment rights to free speech.”). But see Clay Calvert et al., David Doe v. Goliath, Inc.:
Judicial Ferment in 2009 for Business Plaintiffs Seeking the Identities of Anonymous Online
Speakers, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 15 (2009) (discussing how the internet can be harmful
when abused by anonymous speakers).
149. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and
Anonymous Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1537, 1570–74 (2007); Nickerson, supra note
83, at 847–48.
150. See Brenner, supra note 55, at 743–44 (“[T]he less we know about the author of
online content, the more difficult it is for us to assess the merits of what she says.”); Martin,
supra note 54, at 1220 (citing IAN C. BALLON, E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW: TREATISE
WITH FORMS § 1:06 (2004)).
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help promote pluralism by allowing individuals to reach a broader
audience.151
Proponents of free speech note that broad speech rights provide a check
on government power because they allow citizens to voice their grievances
or note when public officials behave in a manner that is unacceptable to
their constituents.152 Anonymous speech advances that interest by allowing
citizens to voice their concern without fear of direct or indirect reprisal.153
Furthermore, protecting the privacy interests of anonymous speakers helps
to advance their individual autonomy by “enabling people to engage in
unconventional activities and express unpopular ideas without fear of
retaliation.”154 The ability of individuals to express their opinions and inner
thoughts may give those individuals a sense of intrinsic satisfaction because
they can explore new ideas and new identities.155
In balancing the interests between speakers and those who may be
harmed by speech, commentators have argued that the government should
take a pragmatic approach by offering greater protection to the speakers and
allowing individual companies or website administrators to take
responsibility for restricting such speech.156
Since website
administrators—as nongovernmental actors—are not bound by First
Amendment limitations, they may be in a better position to vindicate the
rights of those who might be harmed by anonymous speech.157 As
discussed below, however, such an approach may lead to other significant
problems.158

151. See MIKE GODWIN, CYBER RIGHTS: DEFENDING FREE SPEECH IN THE DIGITAL AGE
298 (1998) (discussing how the rise in internet speech can lead to “radical pluralism”).
152. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 542 (1977). The role of anonymous online speech in promoting
democracy may be best illustrated through the use of social media in recent uprisings in Iran
and Egypt. See, e.g., Nassim Nazemi, Note, DCMA § 512 Safe Harbor for Anonymity
Networks Amid a Cyber-Democratic Storm: Lessons from the 2009 Iranian Uprising,
106 NW. U. L. REV. 855, 866–67 (2012) (“[A]rrests [for posting on social media] helped
shine a floodlight on the importance of unfiltered Internet access and online anonymity to
U.S. democratization efforts abroad and U.S. access to world news . . . .”).
153. See, e.g., Solove, supra note 141, at 1199.
154. Id.
155. Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 149, at 1568–69.
156. Id. at 1577, 1582–86 (arguing that there is a fundamental assumption that audiences
of speech are rational and capable of self-governance, and that the Supreme Court’s decision
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), is an example of this assumption).
157. For example, The New York Times allows anonymous or pseudonymous comments
on its website but requires users to register their email addresses and reserves the right to
moderate or remove comments. See Comments & Readers’ Reviews, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/content/help/site/usercontent/usercontent.html (last visited Apr. 19,
2013). Other websites may require the individual to sign in with a social media account,
such as Facebook or Twitter. See Comments and Discussion, WASH. POST,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/interactivity/policy/discussion_faq.html (last visited
Apr. 19, 2013) (allowing commenters to post through either social media applications or a
registration system).
158. See infra notes 349–52 and accompanying text.

3670

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

B. Rationales for Restricting Anonymous Online Speech
Despite the compelling reasons for allowing anonymous online speech,
there are nonetheless strong arguments for restricting such speech. First,
protecting anonymous online speech may not advance traditional freespeech goals because it is not the type of speech that the Supreme Court
contemplated in Talley and McIntyre. Second, ubiquitous anonymous
speech may actually restrict the free discourse of ideas. Third, it may
increase antisocial behavior that adversely impacts minority groups.159
Scholars cite to these countervailing interests to suggest that the
government should adopt lower protections for anonymous online
speech.160
Although the values underlying speech are to discover truth, promote
self-governance, and promote individual liberty, in practice, commentators
note that most anonymous online speech has low speech value and is thus
entitled to lesser protection.161 A narrow reading of Talley and McIntyre
suggests that the Supreme Court was protecting political privacy rather than
creating a broad right to anonymity.162 Anonymous online speech, by
contrast, includes a broader range of speech that may not be political in
nature or promote self-governance and democratic principles.163 Professor
James Gardner argues that anonymity allows individuals to act
disingenuously and to escape accountability for their actions and opinions,
which is antithetical to a healthy political system.164 As such, the interests
of others who may be harmed by anonymous online speech justify certain
restrictions on anonymous speech.165
Professor James Gardner points out that anonymous online speech may
not help promote the free discourse of ideas because internet forums tend to
attract like-minded individuals, which may merely reinforce individuals’
comments and beliefs.166 This group polarization can hinder the free
discourse of ideas and inhibit the truth-seeking function of speech because
individuals with competing viewpoints are not directly engaging with one
159. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 64 (2009)
(discussing the growth of anonymous online mobs that attack minority groups); Michael L.
Siegel, Comment, Hate Speech, Civil Rights, and the Internet: The Jurisdictional and
Human Rights Nightmare, 9 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 375, 381 (1999) (discussing how hate
groups have used the internet to spread their message).
160. See Gleicher, supra note 145, at 330–31 (discussing how the problems with online
harassment of minority groups complicate traditional speech analysis).
161. See Malloy, supra note 66, at 1190–91 (discussing how some online speakers are
careless and irresponsible); Solove, supra note 141, at 1196–97 (comparing different types
of bloggers and concluding that most blogs have low value).
162. See Calvert et al., supra note 148, at 11–13.
163. See id. (suggesting that the right to anonymous speech should be limited to political
speech, which was at issue in the relevant Supreme Court precedent).
164. James A. Gardner, Anonymity and Democratic Citizenship, 19 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 927, 940–41 (2011) (citing John Stuart Mill’s opposition to the secret ballot and
anonymous speech in a political system).
165. See GODWIN, supra note 151, at 299 (discussing the rationality of the fear that an
anonymous commenter may leave a victim with a damaged reputation and no remedy).
166. Gardner, supra note 164, at 945.
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another in an attempt to persuade others or to discover the truth, but rather
merely espousing similar views.167 Because empirical evidence suggests
that anonymity may increase antisocial behavior, Professor Gardner
suggests that deterring some speech may in fact be desirable.168
Moreover, Professor Danielle Citron argues, the rights of anonymous
online speakers should be curtailed to the extent that those rights conflict
with those of disadvantaged and vulnerable groups.169 Those in favor of
broad speech protection for anonymous online speakers argue that
anonymity protects individuals from being harassed for their opinions.170
However, Professor Citron notes that those advocates fail to recognize that
the internet has become a “breeding ground[]” for intolerant and extremist
groups.171 These anonymous speakers attack members of traditionally
disadvantaged groups and can escape reprisal through their anonymity.172
Although current First Amendment jurisprudence does not permit the
government to impose categorical prohibitions on hate speech,173
anonymity precludes speakers from the scrutiny and social sanctions that
they would face if they made the speech in person.174 Protecting those who
might be injured by harmful speech provides justifications for adopting a
flexible disclosure standard for anonymous speakers.175
Additionally, Professor Daniel Solove suggests that anonymous speech
rights should be curtailed because they often infringe upon the privacy
rights of others.176 Although speech that is of public concern is given a
great deal of protection, private speech—like gossip—is given much less
protection.177 Professor Solove argues that anonymous internet speech
should get less protection because it often relates to private concerns.178
Professor Citron posits that restricting the right of private-concern speech
will improve the exchange of ideas and promote political, social, and
economic equality.179 When speakers attack and inspire a sense of fear in
others based on issues of private concern, Professor Citron believes that
167. See id. at 930.
168. Id. at 947.
169. See Citron, supra note 159, at 93–95 (discussing the role of anonymity in civil rights
abuses).
170. See, e.g., Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 149, at 1570–73; Martin, supra note 54, at
1220; Nickerson, supra note 83, at 847–48.
171. Citron, supra note 159, at 62, 69–81.
172. See id. at 66 (discussing how the structure of the internet allows individuals to
escape social stigma for abusive acts).
173. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383–84 (1992) (holding a city
ordinance that prohibited bias-motivated disorderly conduct facially unconstitutional,
because it was a content-based regulation of a category of speech that was not otherwise
subject to regulation, such as fighting words).
174. See Brenner, supra note 55, at 745 (discussing how anonymity allows individuals to
engage in antisocial behaviors).
175. See Calvert et al., supra note 148, at 14–15; Citron, supra note 159, at 94.
176. Solove, supra note 141, at 1198–99.
177. See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776–77 (1978).
178. Solove, supra note 141, at 1198.
179. Citron, supra note 159, at 99–104.
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those victims are more likely to leave the online forum than to use
additional speech to challenge the attackers’ position, contradicting the
underlying premise of the truth-seeking rationale of free speech.180
Finally, anonymous speech increases search costs.181 When individuals
are associated with their ideas, it helps the public to evaluate the veracity of
those messages and to learn of the speakers’ potential biases, allowing the
public to make more informed decisions as to whether to accept the
Although the public may learn of these
speaker’s message.182
circumstances or biases through other mechanisms, knowing the speaker’s
identity helps lower search costs, making it easier to reach a determination
regarding the truthfulness or accuracy of a statement.183
III. CURRENT SPEECH REGULATIONS
Courts and legislatures have both recognized the tension between
protecting anonymous speech rights and guarding against the dangers of
unrestricted anonymous online speech. Courts have had to determine
whether to grant plaintiff subpoena requests seeking to identify allegedly
tortious anonymous speakers. Meanwhile, several state legislatures have
passed or attempted to enact legislation that would ban or restrict
anonymous online-speech rights. Part III.A discusses the various standards
that courts have adopted for granting such subpoena requests. Part III.B
considers the various laws that state legislatures have proposed to ban or
restrict anonymous online speech.
A. Subpoena Standards for Identity Disclosure
Courts today are faced with the task of determining the appropriate level
of protection for anonymous speakers accused of tortious speech. Speakers
can communicate anonymously on the internet in a variety of fora,
including blogs, chat rooms, message boards, and websites.184 Under the
Communications Decency Act,185 the Internet Service Provider (ISP) or
website host is not considered to be the speaker or publisher of any material

180. Id. at 101.
181. See Brenner, supra note 55, at 743–44.
182. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 382–83 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (discussing how allowing anonymous speech makes it easier for people to be
untruthful, thus making it more difficult for voters to discover the truth); Amy Constantine,
Note, What’s in a Name? McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission: An Examination of the
Protection Afforded to Anonymous Political Speech, 29 CONN. L. REV. 459, 469–70 (1996).
183. See Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 149, at 1565–66 (analogizing trademarks to
authorial identity to demonstrate that individuals may rely on the author’s reputation as a
proxy for the statement’s reliability).
184. Susanna Moore, The Challenge of Internet Anonymity: Protecting John Doe on the
Internet, 26 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 469, 470 (2009). Situations in which
speakers identify themselves, such as through social media, are beyond the scope of this
Note.
185. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (codified at
47 U.S.C. §§ 230, 560–61).
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that was provided by another user.186 Thus, they cannot be held civilly
liable for “violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable” material,
regardless of whether the content is constitutionally protected.187 As such,
claimants challenging the content on a website must bring a suit directly
against the person who posted the objectionable material on the website.
Currently, to obtain the identity of an anonymous speaker, a potential
plaintiff must first subpoena the website administrator for the speaker’s
registration information or Internet Protocol address (IP address).188 Then,
the potential plaintiff would need to contact the appropriate ISP to obtain
the actual identity of the speaker based on the IP address.189 This stage
may require a second subpoena.190 This process is controversial because it
allows plaintiffs, oftentimes corporate actors, to initiate lawsuits and obtain
discovery of speakers’ identities without allowing the anonymous
commenters an opportunity to challenge the subpoena request.191
Frequently, individuals and businesses that are harmed by anonymous
speech may be motivated to initiate lawsuits by a desire to silence their
critics rather than by a desire to obtain redress for actual harm.192 These
lawsuits are oftentimes referred to as “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation,” or SLAPP suits.193 To prevent legal process from being
used to chill speech, several states have enacted anti-SLAPP statutes.194
This section reviews the various standards that courts have applied when
determining whether to grant a subpoena for the identity of an anonymous
speaker and discusses commentators’ responses to these standards.195

186. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006).
187. Id. § 230(c)(2)(A).
188. See Moore, supra note 184, at 472; see also Sony Music Entm’t Inc. v. Does 1–40,
326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 558–59 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Doe v. Cahill 884 A.2d 451, 454–55 (Del.
2005).
189. See Sony Music, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 558–59; Cahill 884 A.2d at 454–55; Moore,
supra note 184, at 472.
190. See Sony Music, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 558–59; Cahill 884 A.2d at 454–55; Moore,
supra note 184, at 473.
191. David Sobel, The Process That “John Doe” Is Due: Addressing the Legal
Challenge to Internet Anonymity, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH 3, 14 (2000).
192. Victoria S. Ekstrand, Unmasking Jane and John Doe: Online Anonymity and the
First Amendment, 8 COMM. L. & POL’Y 405, 415 (2003).
193. Id. at 416.
194. Id. Twenty states have enacted anti-SLAPP laws: California, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, and
Washington. Id. at 416 n.50.
195. See, e.g., Calvert et al., supra note 148, at 16–26; Gleicher, supra note 145, at 350–
57; Malloy, supra note 66, at 1189–90; Martin, supra note 54, at 1228–37; Matthew
Mazzotta, Note, Balancing Act: Finding Consensus on Standards for Unmasking
Anonymous Internet Speakers, 51 B.C. L. REV. 833, 844–59 (2010); Moore, supra note 184,
at 473–81; Nickerson, supra note 83, at 864–68.
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1. Good Faith Standard
Of the various standards, Virginia has adopted the least protective
standard for granting subpoenas to reveal the identity of potential
anonymous online speakers. In In re Subpoena Deuces Tecum to America
Online,196 a trial level court adopted the good-faith standard in a case where
a corporate plaintiff sued individuals for publishing “defamatory material
misrepresentations and confidential material insider information.”197 Under
the good-faith standard, a court will grant a subpoena if the court is
“satisfied by the pleadings or evidence supplied to that court,” the
requesting party has a legitimate, good-faith belief that the speech was
actionable, and the requested information is necessary to advance the
claim.198 The Virginia Supreme Court reviewed this case, but did not
render a decision on the discovery standard used by the trial court.199 The
Virginia legislature adopted the trial court’s standard and has codified it
into law.200
The Virginia trial court recognized that a low threshold for obtaining the
identity of speakers would limit the free speech rights of anonymous
speakers.201 The court reasoned, however, that the potential dangers from
revealing the plaintiff’s confidential information were greater than the
anonymity interests of online speakers.202 Furthermore, the court reasoned
that the state had a compelling interest in protecting companies from such
wrongful conduct.203 Thus, the court decided to adopt a good-faith
standard for subpoena disclosures.204
Proponents of the good-faith standard argue that traditional libel law and
the remedies it provides are not suited to addressing the challenges of an
online context and, thus, different standards should be applied for online
libel as opposed to traditional print libel.205 Specifically, they argue,
internet speech has greater permanence, reaches a broader audience, and
thus can have a larger impact. 206 They believe that adopting a less
demanding test for disclosing the identity of the anonymous online speakers
would help enforce current libel laws by making it easier for plaintiffs to
bring claims for defamation.207
196. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26 (Cir. Ct. 2000),
rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Am. Online v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542
S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001). The Circuit Court of Virginia is a trial court.
197. Id. at 26–27.
198. Id. at 37.
199. Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001).
200. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-407.1 (2012).
201. Am. Online I, 52 Va. Cir. at 35.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See Lyrissa B. Lidsky, Anonymity in Cyberspace: What Can We Learn from John
Doe?, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1373, 1390–91 (2009).
206. See Brenner, supra note 55, at 745–46; Martin, supra note 54, at 1234.
207. See Constantine, supra note 182, at 470 (arguing that liberal disclosure laws are
necessary to enforce the law).
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Professor Michael Vogel argues that additional standards at the subpoena
stage create unnecessary challenges for plaintiffs because the current
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide sufficient protection to
anonymous speakers.208 Professor Vogel notes that plaintiffs searching for
an anonymous speaker are unlikely to waste resources and effort unless
they believe that they have a viable legal claim, because initiating a lawsuit
can be time consuming and cumbersome.209 Furthermore, plaintiffs are
unlikely to pursue false claims, because they may be subject to Rule 11
sanctions.210 Thus, Professor Vogel argues, it is unnecessary to provide
additional legal protections for anonymous speakers, and a good-faith
subpoena standard adequately balances the interests of anonymous speakers
with potential victims of anonymous speech.211
Opponents of the good-faith test find that the good faith standard is the
least exacting standard and criticize it as insufficient to protect the rights of
anonymous speakers because it is too easily satisfied.212 These opponents
argue that the good-faith test does not establish a practical or reliable
standard of determining the plaintiff’s actual reasons for filing the lawsuit,
essentially depriving the defendant of any right to anonymity.213
Furthermore, they believe that the good faith standard fails to provide
courts with any guidance as to how the standard should be applied or what
amount of pleading or evidence is necessary to “satisfy” the court that a
commenter’s identity should be disclosed.214
2. Balancing Test Standards
In Columbia Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com,215 the Northern District of
California established the prima facie test for granting a subpoena in a case
where the defendant allegedly committed trademark infringement under
federal and California law.216 Under the prima facie standard, a court

208. Michael S. Vogel, Unmasking “John Doe” Defendants: The Case Against
Excessive Hand-Wringing over Legal Standards, 83 OR. L. REV. 795, 854–55 (2004).
209. Id. at 854.
210. See id. at 855; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c); 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR
R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1336 (3d ed. 2004). Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires lawyers to certify that any claim, defense or legal
contention they make in a pleading or written motion to the court is warranted by existing
law or a nonfrivolous reason for extending the law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2); see also
5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra, § 1334.
211. See Vogel, supra note 208, at 855.
212. Calvert et al., supra note 148, at 41; Martin, supra note 54, at 1228.
213. See, e.g., Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 952 (D.C. 2009) (“The good faith test
. . . may needlessly strip defendants of anonymity in situations where there is no substantial
evidence of wrongdoing, effectively giving little or no First Amendment protection to that
anonymity.”); Calvert et al., supra note 148, at 41.
214. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 184, at 474 (theorizing that “satisfied by the pleading”
likely did not include a substantive review of the plaintiff’s claims).
215. 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
216. Id. at 576; see also Sony Music Entm’t, Inc. v. Does 1–40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 564
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (applying a balancing test in a case alleging copyright infringement for

3676

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

should grant a subpoena that reveals the identity of a defendant if the
plaintiff: identifies the party with specificity,217 makes a good-faith effort
to locate the individual and complies with service of process,218 can
withstand a motion to dismiss,219 and has filed a discovery request that
explains why the information is sought and identifies a limited number of
persons on whom discovery process might be served.220 The key difference
between this test and the good-faith standard is that the Seescandy test
requires the plaintiff to provide notice and withstand a motion to dismiss,
while the good-faith standard has no such requirement.221
In Seescandy, the Northern District of California recognized that the need
to provide redress to injured parties must be balanced against the right of
individuals to speak anonymously online.222 The court also recognized that
if the standard for revealing subpoenas is too low, individuals could use the
discovery process to harass or intimidate individuals who have committed
no wrongful act.223 By requiring the plaintiff to show that it could survive a
motion to dismiss, the court believed that it could minimize or prevent the
use of discovery in harassing or intimidating anonymous online speakers.224
After reviewing Seescandy, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court
of New Jersey adopted a more demanding version of the prima facie test in
Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe.225 That case arose when anonymous
speakers posted allegedly defamatory comments regarding a corporation on
a Yahoo! message board.226 The court held that it would grant the
plaintiff’s subpoena request if (1) the plaintiff attempted to notify the
anonymous posters that they were subject to a subpoena or application for
disclosure, (2) the plaintiff identified the statements that constitute
actionable speech, (3) the court determined that the plaintiff had a prima
facie case against the John Doe defendant that was supported by an
evidentiary showing, and (4) the court balanced the defendant’s First
Amendment right to anonymous speech against the necessity of disclosure
for the plaintiff’s action to proceed.227
Although both the Dendrite test and the Seescandy test require the
plaintiff to identify the defendant, attempt to notify the plaintiff of the
pending action, and demonstrate a prima facie case, the Dendrite court
interpreted the motion to dismiss standard as being more flexible than did
illegal use of file-sharing programs because even though “file sharing is not engaging in true
expression,” it is still “entitled to First Amendment protection”).
217. Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 578.
218. Id. at 579.
219. Id. at 579–80.
220. Id. at 580.
221. Compare id., with In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26
(Cir. Ct. 2000).
222. Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 578.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 578–79.
225. 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
226. Id. at 763.
227. Id. at 760–61; see also Moore, supra note 184, at 478–80.
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the district court in Seescandy.228 The Dendrite court indicated its belief
that the First Amendment concerns in Seescandy were less serious than
those in Dendrite, because Seescandy involved a trademark infringement
suit while Dendrite involved an allegation of defamation; therefore, the
Dendrite court adopted a test that more strongly considered the First
Amendment concerns.229 The Dendrite test interpreted the Seescandy test’s
motion-to-dismiss prong as a “flexible, non-technical, fact-sensitive
mechanism” to ensure that plaintiffs do not abuse the judicial system to
harass online speakers or chill online speech.230 Thus, the court held that it
was appropriate for the trial court judge to require evidence of the plaintiff’s
prima facie case when deciding whether to dismiss the case.231
Proponents of the Dendrite balancing approach believe that it does not
state the right to anonymous speech too broadly, and that it establishes a
standard that plaintiffs can potentially meet, as demonstrated by cases in
which courts have granted plaintiffs’ discovery requests.232 They also
believe that the various prongs of Dendrite adequately consider the interests
of both parties by looking at the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s case, which
helps to protect the defendant’s anonymity unless there is a valid
justification.233
Professor Vogel has criticized the Dendrite balancing test because it
grants the trial court judge too much discretionary power, since the test
requires the judge to look to the merits of a potential claim.234
Furthermore, he argues, the trial judge’s determination is reviewed on an
abuse of discretion standard, which makes it very difficult for the appellate
court to reverse the lower court’s determination.235 This discretionary
power can essentially deprive the plaintiff of his right to seek redress
because the lawsuit cannot proceed without determining the identity of the
defendant.236
3. Summary Judgment Standard
In Doe v. Cahill,237 the Delaware Supreme Court established the
summary judgment standard—one of the most demanding standards for
granting a subpoena—to decide whether disclose an anonymous online

228. Cf. Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 771.
229. Id. at 767.
230. Id. at 771.
231. Id. at 760.
232. See, e.g., Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 149, at 1601–02 (including a balancing prong
in their test to determine whether to grant a subpoena request); Mazzotta, supra note 195, at
862–63; Moore, supra note 184, at 483.
233. Mazzotta, supra note 195, at 862–63 (discussing how balancing tests give courts the
greatest discretion to consider the specific facts of the case); Moore, supra note 184, at 484.
234. Vogel, supra note 208, at 809.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 809–10.
237. 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).
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speaker’s identity.238 The Cahill standard requires a plaintiff to “support
his defamation claim with facts sufficient to defeat a summary judgment
motion,”239 make reasonable efforts to notify the defendant, and “submit
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case for each essential element
of the claim in question.”240 The court noted, however, that the plaintiff
would not be required to provide evidence for those elements for which it
would be impossible to obtain evidence without knowing the defendant’s
identity.241 For example, in a public figure defamation case, the plaintiff
would be required to “prove that: (1) the defendant made a defamatory
statement; (2) concerning the plaintiff; (3) the statement was published; . . .
(4) a third-party would understand the character of the communication as
defamatory . . . [and] that (5) the statement is false.”242 The plaintiff would
not be required to prove that the defendant made the statement with actual
malice.243 The court denied the plaintiff’s subpoena request, holding that
any viewer would understand that the comment was intended as an opinion
and would be unlikely to believe the veracity of the comment.244
In Cahill, a public figure had filed a defamation and invasion of privacy
claim to seek the identity of an anonymous commenter from a Delaware
state news blog.245 At the trial level, the Superior Court of Delaware had
adopted America Online’s good-faith standard.246 However, the Delaware
Supreme Court rejected this approach as insufficient to protect the rights of
online speakers.247 The court discussed the unique features of speech on
the internet248 and analogized online speech with the “modern equivalent of
political pamphleteering.”249 Thus, the court held that its standard for
granting a subpoena must reach the appropriate balance between
anonymous free speech rights and the rights of individuals against

238. Id. at 457.
239. Moore, supra note 184, at 477.
240. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 463 (citing In re Asbestos Litig., 799 A.2d 1151, 1152 (Del.
2002)).
241. Id. at 463.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 464.
244. Id. at 465 (“The ‘reasonable reader, looking at the hundreds and thousands of
postings about the company from a wide variety of posters, would not expect that [the
defendant] was airing anything other than his personal views . . . .’” (quoting Global
Telemedia Int’l, Inc. v. Doe 1, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1268 (C.D. Cal. 2001))).
245. Id. at 454. The comments criticized Cahill’s performance as a city councilman,
stating that “[a]nyone who has spent any amount of time with Cahill would be keenly aware
of such character flaws, not to mention an obvious mental deterioration.” Id. (emphasis
omitted). Another comment stated that “Gahill [sic] is as paranoid as everyone in the town
thinks he is.” Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted).
246. Cahill v. Doe, 879 A.2d 943 (Del. Super. Ct. 2005), rev’d, 884 A.2d 451 (Del.
2005).
247. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 454.
248. Specifically, the court notes that online speech is “less hierarchical and
discriminatory than in the real world because it disguises status indicators such as race, class,
and age.” Id. at 456 (internal quotation marks omitted).
249. Id. at 456.
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defamation.250 The court found that the summary judgment standard would
best achieve this balance.251
The court rejected the good-faith standard because it believed that
plaintiffs would be able to meet that standard too easily, which might cause
plaintiffs to harass defendants and chill online speech.252 The court rejected
the motion to dismiss standard because the threshold for a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)253 motion was merely a pleading standard that
required the plaintiff to provide the opposing party with notice of the claims
against it, and thus, was also insufficient to protect the free speech rights of
anonymous online speakers.254 Although the court approved of Dendrite’s
heightened standard for granting subpoenas, it found that the standard was
too convoluted and unnecessarily complex.255 Thus, the court adopted the
summary judgment standard, finding that it properly balanced the interests
of anonymous online speakers with those of individuals who might be
harmed by such speech.256
Critics of the Cahill standard argue that balancing tests are important to
address the various speech concerns implicated by a particular lawsuit, and
that a summary judgment standard does not fully consider the potential free
speech concerns.257 They note that a plaintiff may be able to meet the
summary judgment standard, but “the harm done by revealing the speaker’s
identity may far outweigh the damage of the libel.”258
The Cahill summary judgment standard has also been criticized for
increasing legal uncertainty.259 Some courts interpret the Cahill standard as
less demanding than Dendrite, while other courts interpret the Cahill
standard as more demanding than Dendrite.260 Furthermore, by adopting a
procedural label, the court created confusion because the standard does not

250. Id.
251. Id. at 457.
252. Id. at 457–58.
253. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). A defendant makes a Rule 12(b)(6) motion when the
defendant believes that the plaintiff, in their complaint, “fail[ed] to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.” Id.; see also 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 210, § 1355.
254. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 458–59.
255. See id. at 461.
256. Id.
257. See, e.g., Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712, 720 (Ariz. 2007) (“[R]equiring the
court to balance the parties’ competing interests is necessary to achieve appropriate rulings
in the vast array of factually distinct cases likely to involve anonymous speech.”); Ashley I.
Kissinger & Katherine Larsen, Untangling the Legal Labyrinth: Protections for Anonymous
Online Speech, 13 NO. 9 J. INTERNET L. 1, 19 (2010).
258. Jonathan D. Jones, Note, Cybersmears and John Doe: How Far Should First
Amendment Protections of Anonymous Internet Speakers Extend?, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV.
421, 439 (2009).
259. See Kissinger & Larsen, supra note 257, at 18.
260. Compare Krinsky v. Doe, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 242–43 (Ct. App. 2008) (adopting
the Cahill standard because the Dendrite standard “required too much” and the motion to
dismiss standard was too low), with Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 456–
57 (Md. 2009) (adopting the test from Dendrite, because the summary judgment standard
would set the bar too high and “undermine personal accountability and the search for truth”).
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actually adhere to the strict procedural definitions of the term summary
judgment.261
Professor Malloy criticizes the Cahill standard because it fails to account
for the inherent characteristics of online speech.262 Although courts have
thus far sought to treat speech on the internet in the same manner as
traditional forms of speech, Malloy notes that online speech is inherently
different from traditional forms of speech, because it is more pervasive,
permanent, and accessible.263 For example, defamation requires defendants
to make an untrue statement of fact and for readers to view the statement as
fact.264 By finding that readers are likely to interpret the statements on
blogs as the speaker’s opinion, rather than as a factual assertion, Professor
Malloy argues that the Cahill court failed to consider that the opinion of
others may nevertheless injure the plaintiff’s reputation or cause him or her
to suffer adverse consequences.265 Following this reasoning, the Cahill
standard—which uses a general defamation standard—is not properly
suited to online speech, because it is almost impossible for plaintiffs to
obtain redress for statements made by anonymous commenters.266
4. 2TheMart Test
Courts have recognized that a different standard should apply for
obtaining the identity of a commenter when he is sought as a witness rather
than as a defendant, but have not delineated the distinction.267 In Doe v.
2TheMart.com, Inc., the Western District of Washington established a test
for granting subpoenas to identify potential witnesses.268 Under this test,
the plaintiff must clearly show that (1) the subpoena was issued in good
faith, (2) the information sought related to a core claim or defense, (3) the
information is directly and materially relevant to that claim or defense, and
(4) such information cannot be obtained from other sources.269 Given that
this holding applies only to witness disclosure, this standard has not
received much attention from other courts or academics.270

261. Kissinger & Larsen, supra note 257, at 18–19.
262. Malloy, supra note 66, at 1190.
263. Id. at 1192; see also Solove, supra note 141, at 1197.
264. See supra Part I.B.1.
265. Malloy, supra note 66, at 1190–91.
266. Id. at 1191–92.
267. See Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 (W.D. Wash. 2001)
(“The standard for disclosing the identity of a non-party witness must be higher than that
articulated in Seescandy.Com and America Online, Inc.”); see also Sedersten v. Taylor, No.
09-3031-CV-S-GAF, 2009 WL 4802567, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 2009); Enterline v.
Pocono Med. Ctr., 751 F. Supp. 2d 782, 787 (M.D. Pa. 2008).
268. See 2TheMart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1095.
269. Id.
270. See Enterline, 751 F. Supp. 2d at 787 (applying the 2TheMart test because it was the
one advocated for by the plaintiff); Sedersten, 2009 WL 4802567, at *2 (applying the
2TheMart test without discussion); see also Kissinger & Larsen, supra note 257, at 21.
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B. Legislative Proposals Seeking To Restrict Anonymous Online Speech
The issue of anonymous online speech has received significant media
attention271 that has motivated state legislatures to propose legislation that
would ban or restrict anonymous online commenting.272 Virginia, the only
state that has passed legislation that addresses the standard for disclosing
the identity of an anonymous commenter, has adopted the good-faith test.273
However, this section will focus on legislative proposals from Georgia,
California, New Jersey, and New York that sought to ban or limit
anonymous speech rights.
Georgia was the first state that sought to enact legislation restricting the
use of false identities online. In 1996, it passed Act 1029, which made it
unlawful for “any person . . . [to] knowingly . . . transmit any data through a
computer network . . . if such data uses any individual name, trade name,
registered trademark, logo, legal or official seal, or copyrighted symbol to
falsely identify the person.”274 The American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) challenged the Act in court, arguing that it was unconstitutional
under the First Amendment because it created an impermissible contentbased restriction and limited individuals’ right to speak anonymously.275 A
district court found that the ACLU would be likely to prevail in its
challenge to the law and therefore granted a preliminary injunction
prohibiting enforcement of the Act.276 Although Georgia state courts have
not yet addressed the constitutionality of this Act, in practice, it has not
been used to restrict or regulate anonymous online speech.277
Ten years later, the New Jersey legislature introduced a bill that would
have required an operator of a computer service or an ISP to “establish and
maintain reasonable procedures to enable any person to request and obtain
disclosure of the legal name and address of an information content provider
271. See, e.g., Sara Gates, Anonymous Comment Ban: Internet Protection Act Threatens
Online Anonymity for New York-Based Websites, HUFFINGTON POST (May 24, 2012, 7:17
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/24/anonymous-comment-ban-legislation-newyork_n_1543033.html; Chris Hannay, Tory MP Says Government Should Do Something
About Anonymous Online Comments, GLOBE & MAIL (Oct. 26, 2012, 1:44 PM), http://www
.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ottawa-notebook/tory-mp-says-government-should-dosomething-about-anonymous-online-comments/article4683094/.
272. See, e.g., A.B. 1143, 2003 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003); A.B. 1327, 212th Leg., 1st
Sess. (N.J. 2006); A.B. 8688, 2012 Leg., 235th Sess. (N.Y. 2012).
273. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-407.1 (2012); see also supra Part III.A.1. California also
considered passing a bill that would establish a standard for discovery requests for the
identity of an anonymous online commenter. See A.B. 1143. After passing in the Assembly,
the state senate did not take any further action on the Bill. Complete Bill History, supra note
12.
274. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-93.1(a) (West 2012), invalidated by White v. Baker, 696 F.
Supp. 2d 1289 (N.D. Ga. 2010).
275. ACLU of Ga. v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228, 1230–31 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
276. Id. at 1234–35 (“[T]he Court concludes that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their
claim that the act is void for vagueness, overbroad, and not narrowly tailored to promote a
compelling state interest.”).
277. See generally Donald J. Karl, Note, State Regulation of Anonymous Internet Use
After ACLU of Georgia v. Miller, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 513 (1998).
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[i.e., speaker] who posts false or defamatory information about the person
on a public forum website.”278 Any person who is damaged as a result of
false or defamatory written messages may sue an ISP that fails to comply
with this provision for compensatory and punitive damages.279 However,
the bill did not define the circumstances under which it would be
“reasonable” for an ISP to disclose a commenter’s identity. The New
Jersey bill was withdrawn in February of 2007 and no subsequent
legislation has been proposed thus far.280
In March 2012, the New York State legislature proposed the Internet
Protection Act,281 which takes a similar approach as New Jersey to address
anonymous online commenting. The bill’s purpose, based on statements by
sponsoring legislators, is to lower the incidence of cyberbullying.282 The
original version of the bill in the state assembly and the current version
being considered by the state senate require that:
A web site administrator upon request shall remove any comments posted
on his or her web site by an anonymous poster unless such anonymous
poster agrees to attach his or her name to the post and confirms that his or
her IP address, legal name, and home address are accurate. All web site
administrators shall have a contact number or e-mail address posted for
such removal requests, clearly visible in any sections where comments are
posted.283

After receiving significant public hostility toward the bill,284 the State
Assembly revised the bill to allow only targets of anonymous posters to
request that the comments be removed, and to require web site
administrators to “make a good faith effort to determine that comments
regarding a victim are factually based . . . and not opinions.”285
The New York and New Jersey proposals are somewhat analogous to the
notice and take-down provisions under the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA).286 The DMCA shields ISPs from liability if, after being
278. A.B. 1327, 212th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2006).
279. Id.
280. Bill Information, N.J. LEGISLATURE, http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/Default

.asp, (last visited Apr. 19, 2013) (on the “Bill Search” sidebar, search for Bill
Number A1327 in Legislative Term 2006–2007; then click the hyperlink for Bill
A1327).
281. S.B. 6779, 2011 Leg., 235th Sess. (N.Y. 2012) (introduced March 21, 2012).
282. Chenda Ngak, New York Lawmakers Propose Ban on Anonymous Online Comments,
CBS NEWS (May 24, 2012, 11:46 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-501465_16257440895-501465/new-york-lawmakers-propose-ban-on-anonymous-online-comments/
(quoting the bill’s sponsors’ statements that the bill’s purpose was to combat cyberbullying).
283. S.B. 6779.
284. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Nearly Half the New York Assembly Republicans:
Require Deletion of Anonymous Comments Whenever Anyone Complains, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (May 3, 2012, 11:54 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/05/03/nearly-half-thenew-york-assembly-republicans-require-deletion-of-anonymous-comments-wheneveranyone-complains/ (arguing that the bill is unconstitutional); see also Gates, supra note 271.
285. A.B. 8688, 2012 Leg., 235th Sess. (N.Y. 2012) (revised July 23, 2012).
286. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified in scattered sections of 17 and 28 U.S.C.).
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notified by the copyright holder of the infringing nature of the work, they
remove the material from their websites.287 Although the New Jersey and
New York proposals operate differently, they also create incentives for ISPs
to remove certain material from their websites. Some commentators have
advocated for imposing more liability on ISPs as a way to address the
problems of online defamation.288 They argue that notice and take-down
procedures are the most efficient and cost-effective mechanisms to regulate
defamatory online speech.289 However, it is unclear whether such
procedures can be adequately designed to restrict defamatory speech, while
continuing to protect legitimate free speech interests of online speakers.290
Other states have sought to limit the anonymous speech rights of a
narrower category of speakers, namely convicted sex offenders. In 2012,
California passed Proposition 35,291 which, among other things, requires
convicted sex offenders to register “[a] list of any and all Internet identifiers
established or used by the person”292 and “[a] list of any and all Internet
service providers used by the person” with the Department of Justice.293
This law will effectively abolish the right to anonymous speech for
convicted sex offenders.294 The ACLU and the Electronic Frontier
Foundation filed a lawsuit the day after California voted to approve
Proposition 35.295 The Northern District Court of California granted
plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, but it has not yet ruled on
the constitutionality of the Proposition.296 The State filed an appeal with
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on February 12, 2013.297
The Ninth Circuit may be guided by legal developments in Georgia. The
Georgia state legislature passed a law that also required convicted sex
287. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (2006).
288. Cf. Ryan King, Online Defamation: Bringing the Communications Decency Act of
1996 in Line with Sound Public Policy, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 24, ¶ 11 (2003); Jason
C. Miller, Who’s Exposing John Doe? Distinguishing Between Public and Private Figure
Plaintiffs in Subpoenas to ISPs in Anonymous Online Defamation Suits, 13 J. TECH. L. &
POL’Y 229, 239 (2008).
289. Miller, supra note 288, at 239.
290. See infra Part IV.B.
291. Californians Against Sexual Exploitation Act, 2012 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 35, § 12
(West) (to be codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.015(a)(4) (West 2013)).
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Cf. id. § 13 (defining “internet identifier” broadly to include any online persona or
identity that an individual may create).
295. See Complaint, Doe v. Harris, No. C12-5713 (N.D. Cal. filed Nov. 7, 2012),
available at https://www.eff.org/cases/doe-v-harris.
296. See Doe v. Harris, No. C12-5713 TEH, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5428 (N.D. Cal. Jan.
11, 2013).
297. See Doe v. Harris, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/cases/doe-vharris (last visited Apr. 19, 2013); John Doe, et al. v. Kamala Harri, JUSTIA DOCKETS AND
FILINGS, http://dockets.justia.com/docket/circuit-courts/ca9/13-15267/ (last visited Apr. 19,
2013) (referring to Doe v. Harris). For the appellant’s opening brief, see Opening Brief of
the Defendant-Appellant, Doe v. Harris, No. 15263 (9th Cir. Apr. 10, 2013), available at
https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/states_opening_brief.pdf. At the time of this
writing, the Plaintiff-Appellees have not yet filed their briefs.
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offenders to register information about their online identity.298 However,
the Northern District of Georgia declared the law unconstitutional because
the statute was vague and not narrowly tailored to accomplish a legitimate
state interest.299
IV. CREATING A COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL STANDARD
Judicial subpoena standards and legislative regulations restricting
anonymous speech approach the issue of anonymous speech from different
angles.
Subpoena standards allow judges to make individualized
determinations based on the particular facts of the case, but this leads to the
patchwork of approaches that courts have so far taken.300 Such discordant
standards create uncertainty regarding individuals’ speech rights as
speakers’ rights will be affected both by the underlying action and
applicable law. In contrast, legislative standards may create more
uniformity, but the legislature may impose categorical restrictions on a
narrow type of speech, such as defamation or fighting words.301 If the
legislature wants to establish broader content-based speech regulations,
those regulations must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest to be deemed constitutionally permissible.302 Part IV.A analyzes
the aforementioned judicial standards and concludes that the government
should adopt the Cahill standard, which requires plaintiffs to meet a
summary judgment standard before obtaining disclosure. Part IV.B
discusses how the legislature should expand the legal rights for victims of
defamation and online harms to balance the protection of anonymous
speech with the problems it may cause.
A. Subpoena Disclosure Standard
In reality, anonymous online commenting does not reflect the historical
notion that anonymous speech promotes democratic principles by allowing
freedom of participation as envisaged in Talley and McIntyre.303 Yet, many
of the justifications for restricting anonymous speech used in Buckley and
Citizens United—such as protecting the integrity of the political process
and providing citizens with the information they need to make informed
political decisions304—are not present to the same extent in anonymous
online speech.305 Because anonymous online speech “is, on average, less
valuable than nonanonymous speech,”306 it should be afforded an
298. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(16)(K) (West 2008), invalidated by White v. Baker,
696 F. Supp. 2d 1289 (N.D. Ga. 2010).
299. Baker, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 1309–12.
300. See supra Part III.A.
301. See supra notes 18–23 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 104–05, 114 and accompanying text.
304. See supra Part I.C.2.
305. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
306. See Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 149, at 1559; see also supra notes 161–63, 169–72
and accompanying text.
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intermediate degree of protection when parties seek to identify these
speakers. The standard that best accomplishes this aim is the summary
judgment test established by the Delaware Supreme Court in Cahill.307 The
Cahill standard should be adopted because it offers the highest level of
protection for anonymous speakers and thus advances speakers’ free speech
rights, is the most straightforward to apply, and is preferable to the
alternative tests.308
Cahill requires plaintiffs to meet a high burden—proving a prima facie
case or meeting a summary judgment standard—before they can discover
an anonymous speakers’ identity, thereby affording the greatest level of
protection for anonymous speakers.309 It is important to protect anonymous
speakers’ rights to avoid creating a chilling effect on online speech.310
Under a marketplace of ideas theory for free speech rights, various ideas
will compete and the truth will ultimately prevail.311 Although some critics
argue that speech on the internet has a higher potential for causing injury,312
it is important to note the context of speech when determining whether
injury will result. For example, readers are less likely to trust the veracity
of a college gossip website than that of a reputable website.313 Thus, the
mere existence of speech will not necessarily cause injury.
Anonymous speech rights also help promote the truth-seeking function of
free speech protections by allowing individuals to disclose information
without fear of reprisal.314 If the disclosure standard is too low, it will
allow individuals or critics to obtain a speaker’s identity for the purpose of
harassment or intimidation.315 Statistically, plaintiffs are unlikely to prevail
in a defamation suit and most John Doe subpoenas are sought by corporate
plaintiffs trying to silence their critics.316 To prevent needless disclosure of
an anonymous speaker’s identity, courts should not require disclosure
unless there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the plaintiff will win on
the merits of the case. Otherwise, speakers may be wary of making
statements if they believe that the message can be traced back to them,
creating a chilling effect on speech.317 This type of scenario may arise in
situations where an employee wants to reveal information about his
307. See supra Part III.A.3.
308. For a discussion of the Cahill standard, see supra notes 239–44 and accompanying
text.
309. See supra notes 239–40 and accompanying text.
310. See supra Part II.A.
311. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. But see Scot Wilson, Corporate
Criticism on the Internet: The Fine Line Between Anonymous Speech and Cybersmear,
29 PEPP. L. REV. 533, 540–42 (2002) (arguing that the “free marketplace” interpretation of
anonymous online speech is limited because of the difficulty in drawing a line between
lawful and defamatory speech).
312. See Malloy, supra note 66, at 1190; see also supra notes 169–72 and accompanying
text.
313. See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text.
314. See supra Part II.A.
315. See supra notes 192–93 and accompanying text.
316. See Moore, supra note 184, at 470–71.
317. See supra notes 149–55 and accompanying text.
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employer that may be of important public interest, but fears employer
retaliation.318
The Cahill summary judgment test better protects anonymous speech,
because it is more straightforward and easier to apply than Dendrite’s
multifactored balancing test.319 The fifth prong of the balancing test in
Dendrite, which seeks to balance the protections of speech and its potential
harm, is redundant because the same balancing is inherent in the summary
judgment test.320 Additionally, the balancing test creates ambiguity, which
makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to raise meritorious claims, because
plaintiffs will be unsure when they have a valid legal claim.321 Uncertainty
in outcome may deter some plaintiffs from litigating their cases, thereby
preventing them from accessing justice and allowing speakers to continue
making potentially defamatory comments.
The summary judgment
standard includes an inherent balancing test because it permits disclosure
only when a plaintiff has a viable legal claim.322
The summary judgment test may protect less speech than a balancing test
because it does not protect speakers when the speaker’s interest in
maintaining anonymity exceeds the plaintiff’s interest in pursuing a viable
legal claim. However, the summary judgment standard is preferable,
because a balancing test would grant anonymous online speakers greater
speech protections than they would have in other speech contexts.323
The summary judgment test is also preferable to the good-faith standard,
because the good-faith standard is too easily satisfied, allowing disclosure
even in situations where the speaker may have an important anonymity
interest.324 The good-faith standard gives plaintiffs an incentive to file suits
to discover the identity of the commenter even if the plaintiff lacks a legal
claim.325 This standard essentially deprives defendants from saying
anything derogatory about another person, because such comments would
likely be sufficient to create a “good-faith” belief that the speech is
actionable. Yet, the Supreme Court has held that speech cannot be
restricted merely because it may be offensive.326 Thus, the good-faith test
fails to afford anonymous speakers adequate protection. The good-faith
standard comes from an early case addressing online anonymity but has not
received much traction, with modern courts instead choosing to adopt a
balancing test or summary judgment standard.327
318. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 255–56 and accompanying text.
320. Recent Cases, Maryland Court of Appeals Sets Out Process Required Before Court
May Compel Identification of Anonymous Internet Defendants, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1011,
1014–15 (2010) [hereinafter Anonymous Internet Defenders].
321. See supra notes 234–35 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 239–40 and accompanying text.
323. See Anonymous Internet Defenders, supra note 320, at 1015.
324. See supra notes 212–14 and accompanying text.
325. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
326. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
327. Calvert et al., supra note 148, at 40; see supra Part III.A.2–3.
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Professor Susanna Moore argues that the Cahill standard is too
demanding because it is impossible for plaintiffs to prove malice without
knowing the identity of the defendant.328 Professor Moore, however, fails
to note that the Cahill standard only requires the plaintiff to prove the
elements that are within their control and thus would not be required to
prove malice to obtain the subpoena.329 Yet, this provision leads others to
criticize Cahill for purportedly adopting a procedural approach while
relaxing certain requirements, thereby confusing potential litigants.330 This
argument is technical and does not address the merits of the Cahill test. As
a practical matter, it would be impossible for the plaintiff to provide all the
evidence necessary to support his claim without knowing the defendant’s
identity. In choosing among the various standards, requiring the plaintiff to
provide as much evidence as possible—as the Cahill standard requires—is
the next best alternative to ensure that the litigation is not frivolous or being
raised for malicious purposes.
Some critics of the Cahill test argue instead that Dendrite’s notice
requirement, which requires plaintiffs to notify the speaker of the pendency
of the subpoena request, provides greater protection for anonymous
speakers because it allows them to defend themselves.331 Professor Moore,
in particular, argues that it is fairer to place the burden on the plaintiff than
on the ISP, because the plaintiff has a greater interest in the litigation and
thus is more likely to give notice than a disinterested party.332 These
commentators, however, provide no reason that the notice requirement
cannot be applied to the summary judgment standard.333 In Cahill, the
court specifically included a notice requirement, thereby demonstrating that
a notice requirement can be adopted without changing the nature of the
standard.334
Despite the criticism of the summary judgment standard, it remains the
best standard for protecting anonymous online speech. Some individuals
may abuse their anonymity rights,335 but lowering the standard for
disclosure is unlikely to have a significant impact unless the speaker can be
subjected to legal sanctions to deter future misconduct. Thus, courts should
adopt the summary judgment standard for deciding when to reveal an
anonymous speaker’s identity.

328. See Moore, supra note 184, at 481.
329. See supra notes 241–44 and accompanying text.
330. See supra note 261 and accompanying text, see also Kissinger & Larsen, supra note
257, at 18–19.
331. See Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 149, at 1598; Moore, supra note 184, at 483.
332. See Moore, supra note 184, at 438–84 (“ISPs cannot be expected to carry the burden
of notification on behalf of their users without a clear mandate or incentive to do so.”).
333. Cf. id. (recognizing that the Cahill standard also includes a notice requirement but
failing to explain why the Dendrite standard is better with respect to the notice requirement).
334. See Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 460 (Del. 2005) (retaining the notification prong of
the Dendrite standard).
335. See supra Part II.B.
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Additionally, states should adopt a summary judgment standard to permit
the disclosure of an anonymous speaker’s identity regardless of the
underlying dispute. The Ninth Circuit and Professor Clay Calvert argue
that the standard for disclosing the identity of the speaker should depend
upon the nature of the underlying litigation.336 However, the summary
judgment standard inherently accounts for the nature of the underlying suit
by allowing discovery only when the plaintiff provides evidence to prove
wrongdoing by the speaker.337 Imposing different standards for various
types of speech, while preferable in theory, would create problems in
practice by creating uncertainty in an area of the law that should be clear.338
B. Legislative Responses
The government should not seek to ban anonymous online speech
because, despite those who would abuse the right, anonymous online
speech serves many legitimate interests. Since most legislation that restricts
the right likely will be found unconstitutional,339 legislatures should instead
regulate anonymous online commenting indirectly by redefining the set of
harms for which individuals may seek redress.340
Individual states should not try to address the problems associated with
anonymous online commenting by imposing restrictions or bans on such
speech, because any law they adopt would likely create a dormant
commerce clause problem.341 If one state tries to regulate the internet, it
would create jurisdictional problems because the legislation would
inherently implicate activity in other states.342 Even national regulation of
anonymous speech may be legally problematic because of its international
implications.343
Legislatures should not seek to create a take-down procedure analogous
to those for copyright infringement under the DMCA, because there is an
inherent difference between the values that underlie free speech and those
336. See In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1177 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e
suggest that the nature of the speech should be a driving force in choosing a standard by
which to balance the rights of anonymous speakers in discovery disputes.”); Calvert et al.,
supra note 148, at 47–48.
337. See supra notes 250–51 and accompanying text.
338. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
339. See supra Part I.A.
340. See supra Part I.B.
341. The Dormant Commerce Clause problem occurs when one state’s laws or
regulations implicate activity in other states and is problematic because it may lead to
protectionist regulation by the states and undermine the national market. See Brown-Forman
Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 580 (1986).
342. See, e.g., Kenneth D. Bassinger, Note, Dormant Commerce Clause Limits on State
Regulation of the Internet: The Transportation Analogy, 32 GA. L. REV. 889 (1998); James
E. Gaylord, Note, State Regulatory Jurisdiction and the Internet: Letting the Dormant
Commerce Clause Lie, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1095 (1999); Ari Lanin, Note, Who Controls the
Internet? States’ Rights and the Reawakening of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 73 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1423 (2000).
343. See John Rothschild, Protecting the Digital Consumer: The Limits of Cyberspace
Utopianism, 74 IND. L.J. 893 (1999).
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that support copyright law.344 Copyright laws are meant to protect the
economic interests of those who produce expressive works.345 In contrast,
the First Amendment protects the freedom of expression.346 Although
removal of content may restrict some speech, the Supreme Court has
rejected First Amendment challenges in copyright infringement cases.347 It
is reasonable for courts to err on the side of restricting the dissemination of
infringing material, because the interest of the copyright owner may be lost
if it is not enforced in a timely manner. However, the First Amendment is
meant to protect expression, and that right would be undermined if ISPs or
website administrators were required to remove speech.348
Moreover, determining copyright infringement is an objective assessment
that the ISP can resolve, while speech regulation is more subjective and
harder to define. Anonymous online speech includes a broader range of
speech, much of which the government cannot restrict.349 An ISP or
website administrator could not be expected to reasonably know whether
speech may be restricted, which is likely to result in an overregulation of
speech. Additionally, unfamiliarity with the legal standard for permissible
speech regulation could cause unequal application of the law, because each
website administrator could adopt different standards for take-downs.350
Further, the determination would be subject to the individual biases of the
website administrator. This unequal application of a statute would prevent
the creation of clear standards, which, in turn, is likely to deter protected
speech.
The proposed bill from New York illustrates other constitutional defects
of laws that seek to limit anonymous speech through the use of take-down
procedures because both versions of the bill are vague, overbroad and
underinclusive.351 The proposed laws are vague because they fail to put
speakers on notice of what speech is protected and to provide guidelines for
when website administrators should remove speech.352 Although the
Assembly version is more specific and instructs administrators to “make a
good faith effort to determine that comments regarding a victim are
factually based,”353 it fails to explain what actions are required for a good-

344. See supra Part II.A (discussing the values underlying free speech protection).
345. Cf. Kevin M. Lemley, The Innovative Medium Defense: A Doctrine To Promote the
Multiple Goals of Copyright in the Wake of Advancing Digital Technologies, 110 PENN ST.
L. REV. 111, 134 (2005) (“[C]opyright law promotes the public interest by providing authors
with economic incentives to create new works of authorship . . . .”).
346. See supra notes 141, 149 and accompanying text.
347. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555–56 (1985).
348. See supra notes 153–55 and accompanying text.
349. See supra Part I.A.
350. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 40–44, 283–85 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 40–42, 283–85 and accompanying text.
353. A.B. 8688, 2012 Leg., 235th Sess. (N.Y. 2012) (revised July 23, 2012).
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faith effort.354 Furthermore, both versions of the bill are underinclusive
because by addressing only instances of anonymous attacks, they fail to
address instances of cyberbullying—the bill’s stated purpose—that are
conducted publicly or through identifiable social media profiles.355
The New York proposal that the state senate is considering is content
neutral, because it requires an administrator to remove all anonymous
comments upon request, without regard to the content of the speech.356
Thus, the regulation would be subject to intermediate scrutiny, requiring
that the law be substantially related to an important governmental
interest.357 While the bill’s goal of combating cyberbullying is an
important government interest,358 the law is not substantially related to that
The law is
aim because it restricts nonbullying speech.359
unconstitutionally overbroad because it may result in the restriction of
speech that is otherwise constitutionally permissible.360 Instead, the
legislature should adopt a different solution that is more narrowly tailored
to achieve the law’s ends without infringing upon First Amendment
rights.361
Online speech falls into many categories, each subject to its own standard
of scrutiny.362 Thus, any legislation seeking to regulate anonymous online
speech would need to differentiate between the various types of speech.363
The New York State Assembly, perhaps realizing this, revised the bill to
limit its application to defamatory speech.364 This proposal, however, is
content based because it requires website administrators to remove
comments upon request based on the speaker’s message.365 As such, the
law is subject to strict scrutiny and must be narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling government interest.366 Even assuming that the government’s
interest in ending defamatory online speech is compelling for the purposes
of the First Amendment, the regulation is likely unconstitutional because it
354. The ambiguity caused by this good-faith standard would be analogous to the
problems caused by Virginia’s good-faith standard for granting a disclosure subpoena. See
supra notes 213–14 and accompanying text.
355. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
358. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 282–84 and accompanying text.
360. Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 149, at 1590–93 (discussing the standards that states
should use when seeking to regulate anonymous online speech).
361. See, e.g., Andrew B. Carrabis & Seth D. Haimovitch, Cyberbullying: Adaptation
from the Old School Sandlot to the 21st Century World Wide Web—The Court System and
Technology Law’s Race To Keep Pace, 16 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 143 (2011); Jamie Wolf,
Note, The Playground Bully Has Gone Digital: The Dangers of Cyberbullying, the First
Amendment Implications, and the Necessary Responses, 10 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y &
ETHICS J. 575 (2012).
362. See supra Part I.A.
363. Martin, supra note 54, at 1240–41.
364. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 29–34, 285 and accompanying text.
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is overbroad.367 Governments may regulate defamatory speech because the
reputational interest of the target of the speech exceeds the speaker’s
interest in the speaker (which is low, because such speech is oftentimes an
issue of private, rather than public, concern).368 The government, however,
may not regulate speech merely because it is offensive or distasteful.369
The New York bill essentially requires website administrators to remove
postings upon the request of the target of the speech, which is likely to
result in the removal of speech that, while offensive, fails to meet the
specific legal requirements for defamation.370
Given the constitutional difficulties in shaping legislation to restrict
anonymous online speech, the legislature should seek alternative solutions
to address the issue of cyberbullying and other forms of harmful online
speech.
CONCLUSION
The right to free speech, including the right to anonymous speech, is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution. Though the government
may restrict certain forms of speech through regulation, and other types of
speech by imposing civil liability for harmful speech, those regulations and
restrictions must be justified based on the severity of the limitation being
imposed.371 As more speech is disseminated through the internet, the
government must find a way to balance the interest of speakers with that of
individuals who may be harmed by defamatory or hateful speech. Courts
have adopted various standards for granting subpoena requests to allow
discovery of anonymous speakers’ identities. Appellate courts should adopt
the summary judgment standard, because it best protects individuals’
speech rights without making it impossible for plaintiffs to seek redress for
their injuries.
Despite their concern for the potential harms arising from anonymous
online speech, legislatures should not seek to ban anonymous speech.
Instead, they should redefine defamation in an online context to account for
the differences between online speech and other traditional mediums of
speech. This would expand the remedies available to potential victims of
harmful speech and allow them to bring suit when the interests of the
victims exceed the free speech interests of the speaker.

367. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
368. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343–44 (1974) (applying a different
standard for defamation of public persons from that of private individuals).
369. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
370. See supra Part I.B.1.
371. See supra Part I.A.

